Abstract. In this paper we study the resistance of a block cipher against any general iterated attack. This class of attacks includes di erential and linear cryptanalysis. We prove that we can upper bound the complexity of the attack by using Vaudenay's decorrelation technique. Our main theorem enables to prove the security of some recently proposed block ciphers COCONUT98 and PEANUT98.
Since public-key cryptography has been discovered in the late 70s, proving the security of cryptographic protocols has been a challenging problem. Recently, the random oracle model and the generic algorithm techniques have introduced new tools for validating cryptographic algorithms. Although much older, the area of symmetric cryptography did not get so many tools.
In the early 90s, Biham and Shamir 2] introduced the notion of di erential cryptanalysis and Matsui 7, 8] introduced the notion of linear cryptanalysis, which was a quite general model of attack. Since then many authors tried to formalize these attacks and study their complexity in order to prove the security of block ciphers against it. Earlier work, initiated by Nyberg 9] was based on algebraic techniques.
Recently, Vaudenay adapted Carter and Wegman's combinatoric notion of universal functions 3, 16] in context of encryption and formalized the notion of decorrelation bias 13] . This measurement enables to quantify the security of block ciphers against several classes of attacks. In 13], several real-life block ciphers have been proposed, namely COCONUT98 and PEANUT98. Their decorrelation bias have been measured, and the security against di erential and linear cryptanalysis has been proved.
In this paper, we generalize these results in a uniform approach. We introduce the notion of iterated attack of order d and we prove how the decorrelation bias can measure the security against any of it. Di erential and linear cryptanalysis happen to be included in this class of attacks. This paper is organized as follows. First we recall the previous results in decorrelation theory which are interesting for our purpose in Section 1. Our contribution starts on page 6 in Section 2. We de ne the notion of iterated attack of given order. We prove that decorrelation of order d is not su cient to thwart all iterated attacks of order d with a counterexample. We then show how decorrelation of order 2d gives an upper bound on the e ciency of any iterated attacks of order d. We show how to use this result for a practical block cipher (namely, PEANUT98). Finally, in Section 3 we investigate how to use the same techniques for combining several cryptanalysis all together.
Previous Work
We brie y recall some of Vaudenay's de nitions and results about decorrelation which are taken from 13].
Decorrelation Theory
In this setup, a block cipher is considered as a random permutation C over a message-block space M. (Here the randomness comes from the random choice of the secret key.) The e ciency of a cryptanalysis can be measured by the average complexity of the algorithm over the distribution of the permutation (i.e. of the secret key).
De nition 1. Given a random function F from a given set M 1 to a given set M 2 Random permutations C are compared to a uniformly distributed permutations C (which will be called perfect cipher, and the decorrelation of which will be said to be perfect). For instance, saying that a cipher C on M has a perfect pairwise decorrelation means that for any x 1 6 = x 2 , the random variable (C(x 1 ); C(x 2 )) is uniformly distributed among all the (y 1 ; y 2 ) pairs such that y 1 
Thus we can built ciphers with arbitrarily small decorrelation bias by iterating a simple cipher as long as its own decorrelation bias is smaller than 1. The security results show that when the decorrelation bias is small, then the complexity of the attack is high.
Security Model
In the Luby-Racko model, an attacker is an in nitely powerful Turing machine A O which has access to an oracle O whose aim is to distinguish a cipher C from the Perfect Cipher C by querying the oracle which implements either cipher, and with a limited number d of inputs (see 6]). The oracle O either implements C or C , and that the attacker must nally answer 0 (\reject") or 1 (\accept"). We measure the ability to distinguish C from C by the advantage Adv A (C) = jp ? p j where p (resp. p ) is the probability of answering 1 if O implements C (resp. C ). In this paper we focus on non-adaptive attacks i.e. on distinguishers illustrated on Fig. 1: here no x i queried to the oracle depends on some previous answers y j .
Input: an oracle which implements a permutation c We call basic di erential (resp. linear) cryptanalysis the distinguisher which is characterized by a pair (a; b) 2 M 2 and which is depicted on Fig. 2 (resp. Fig. 3 ). Linear cryptanalysis also needs an acceptance set B. This asymptotic result comes from approximation to the normal law by the Central Limit Theorem, which is correct whenever n is not too small (i.e. n > 30). This result is thus actually valid for any practical n. So, if the pairwise decorrelation bias has the order of 2 ?m , linear distinguishers does not work against C, but with a complexity in the scale of 2 m .
Some Constructions
In 13], two real-life block ciphers have been proposed: COCONUT98 and PEANUT98. They come from the general COCONUT and PEANUT family constructions respectively. A cipher in the COCONUT family is characterized by some parameters (m; p) where m is the message-block length and p is an irreducible polynomial of degree m in GF (2 
Iterated Attacks of Order d
In this section we introduce the notion of iterated attack.
De nition
Theorems 5 and 6 suggest that we try to generalize them to attacks in the model depicted on Fig. 4 . In this model, we iterate a d-limited non-adaptive attack T . We assume that this attack obtains a sample (X; Y ) with X = (X 1 ; : : : ; X d ) and Y = (Y 1 ; : : : ; Y d ) such that y i = c(X i ) for a given distribution of X. Thus, we can think of a known plaintext attack where X has a xed distribution (e.g. a uniform distribution) or of a chosen plaintext attack where X has a given distribution (e.g. in di erential cryptanalysis, X = (X 1 ; X 1 +a) where X 1 has a uniform distribution). The result of the attack depends on the result of all iterated ones in a way characterized by a set A. 
A Counterexample
It is tenting to believe that a cipher resists to this model of attacks once it has a small d-wise decorrelation bias. This is wrong as the following example shows. Let C be a cipher with a perfect d-wise decorrelation. We assume that an instance c of C is totally de ned by d (x i ; y i ) points so that C is uniformly distributed in a set of This problem actually comes from the fact that the tests T provide a same expected result for C and C but a totally di erent standard deviation.
Security Result
We can however prove the security when the cipher has a good decorrelation to the order 2d. . Proof. Let Z (resp. Z ) be the probability that the test accepts (X; C(X)) (resp. (X; C (X))), i.e. Z = E X (T (X; C(X))): Let p (resp. p ) be the probability that the attack accepts, i.e. The crucial point in the proof is in proving that jZ ?Z j is small within a high probability. For this, we need jE(Z) ? E(Z )j and jV (Z) ? V (Z )j to be both small.
From Theorem 4 we know that jE(Z) The sum over all x and x 0 entries with colliding entries (i.e. with some x i = x 0 j ) is less than . The sum over all y and y 0 entries with colliding entries and no colliding x and x 0 is less than d will have an advantage greater than 50%. For linear cryptanalysis, this result is weaker than Theorem 6, but more general.
All these results are applicable to the COCONUT98 Cipher as well since its pairwise decorrelation bias is even smaller (it is actually zero).
On Combining Several Attacks
When several (ine cient) attacks hold against a cipher C, it is natural to wonder whether or not we can combine their e ort in order to get an e cient attack. This situation is formalized by changing a few things on Fig. 4 and we can rewrite Theorem 8 in this setting. Firstly, the test in each iteration can be changed. Secondly, n must be considered as relatively small, and d as relatively large. The resulting model is illustrated on Fig. 5 .
We let now r denotes the number of attacks and A i denotes the ith one. We let Adv 0 i denote its advantage, and i denote the probability that the two A i attack executions query c with one input in common. We assume that we have n i M=2 for any i. For any combined attack (depicted on Fig. 5 ) with independent attacks, we have 
Conclusion
We showed how to unify di erential and linear distinguishers in a general notion of iterated attack. We then proved that decorrelation enables to quantify the security against any iterated attack. This result happened to be applicable to a real life block cipher. Our result are however not so tight, and it is still an open problem to improve the complexity upper bounds. We encourage researches in this direction.
